Ways and means of mobilising money and resources for war: a report from Session 69 XIV Congress of the International Economic History Association (Helsinki 21-25 August, 2006) by González-Enciso, A. (Agustín) & Bowen, H.V. (H.V.)
 [Memoria y Civilización (M&C), 9, 2006, 173-200] 
Ways and means of mobilising money and 
resources for war: a report from Session 69 
XIV Congress of the International Economic 
History Association (Helsinki 21-25 August, 
2006). 
A. González Enciso and H.V. Bowen 
Universidad de Navarra / University of Leicester 
The general topic “mobilising money and resources for war” 
around which Session 69 was convened, must be understood as a 
central aspect of the building of the modern state as well as being an 
agent of economic growth. External defence (or attack) and the 
maintenance of internal order have always been the fundamental 
responsibilities of the states, but in early modern times were almost 
their only tasks; and therefore, mobilising resources for that purpose 
became of the utmost importance as an influence upon state building.  
In fact, the very existence of states at that time depended to a great 
extent on their ability to mobilise resources for war and on the 
effectiveness with which they managed to do it. 
Part of these activities lay directly under the realm of politics, 
others had important administrative implications, and many of them 
affected the economic sphere. In this last case, they can be considered 
directly as economic matters (such as production or transportation of 
different goods), or can be seen to have indirectly affected the 
economy though their influence upon institutional change, the creation 
of new opportunities, the transference of rents, and so on, not to speak 
about the particular importance of the fiscal systems and their 
economic, social and institutional impacts. It is clear then, that 
economic organisation and economic growth are directly influenced 
by the ways in which states set about mobilising their resources for 
the purpose of war-making. 
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Many aspects of this subject are well known, but others less so, 
and we still lack a good explanation of the interplay between state 
building, resource mobilisation, and economic growth. Since war is 
the final stage of mobilising resources, the ways in which these 
resources were translated into military or naval strength in the conflict 
arena undoubtedly influences the outcome of the strife. But what 
exactly is this influence and how is it related to the economic or 
political strength of different states? 
The idea of organising a Session at the Helsinki International 
Economic History Congress arose from a research project addressing 
the same general issues1 and we wanted to include other historians 
interested in this very wide and important topic. We were looking for 
people able to offer national or comparative perspectives on key 
issues, and the outcome has been excellent since fifteen high-quality 
papers have been presented dealing with different problems and 
countries during the early modern period, from 1600 to 1815. 
A group of papers address directly the nature of the fiscal 
military state both from a wider point of view and from more precise 
topics, and some of them include important comparative perspectives. 
Glete's paper provides us with a general framework since the author 
faces up to the problem from the perspective offered by the 
development of the Swedish state2. Asking about the origin, evolution 
and decline of the fiscal military state, Glete makes, first of all, a clear 
assertion about the fiscal-military character of Swedish state. “The 
fundamental precondition for both Sweden's expansion from 1561 to 
1660, says Glete, and the defence of the empire from 1660 to 1721 
was the ability to quickly send a major combat-ready army, supported 
by a large navy to the continent”. This meant that Sweden had to 
maintain large domestically financed armed forces, and this implies 
                                                      
1 A recent publication is H.V. BOWEN and A. GONZÁLEZ ENCISO, eds., 
Mobilising Resources for War: Britain and Spain at Work During the Early 
Modern Period, Pamplona, EUNSA, 2006. 
2 J. GLETE, “The Swedish fiscal-military state in transition and 
decline, 1650-1850”. 
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that Sweden was not a domain, but a fiscal state, and that she had the 
capability of mobilising large resources, human and material. 
In order to explain the formation and development of Swedish 
fiscal-military state during the seventeenth century, Glete reminds us 
of the existing literature that stresses that efforts made to get 
innovations in different fields as well as a purpose to reduce 
transaction costs were of central importance for Sweden's ability to 
fight long wars. The dynastic state acted as a powerful agent 
reshaping the supply of resources, humane and material, but politics 
were also important and the parliament was the institution which 
determined how the burden of war should be shared. The author 
identifies a series of factors involved in the process, mainly manpower 
and money, and in particular the way how to get them. In respect to 
the funds, he specifies different kinds of income streams: tax 
revenues, of course, but also loans, contributions raised from occupied 
territories, and foreign subsidies. 
In all cases Sweden was able to organise herself for the raising 
of taxes in an efficient way. The author refers to the question of 
modernisation, interprets it as necessary, and describes it as the 
development of skills and innovations that will enable the state to 
mobilise different resources trough administrative organisation and 
political ability. Institutional change such as developments in the 
parliament, landownership and others, are central to explanation of 
successful negotiations with various interest groups in order to 
mobilise resources. As a result, the empire “was largely the result of 
the rulers’ unusual ability to use military resources with imagination. 
When that ability disappeared the entrepreneurial dynastic state was 
politically dead”. As a matter of fact, this political ability seemed to 
decline in the eighteenth century, and it seems that Swedish politicians 
were not so interested in large wars if they were not in Sweden’s own 
interest. Yet, in spite of that, Sweden received many foreign subsidies 
which become a normal part of the state’s financial system. 
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Marjolein 't Hart's paper3 studies a fundamental aspect of the 
fiscal-military state, the financial revolution, which is an established 
fact for the seventeenth century Dutch Republic. Even decentralised, 
the Dutch system had considerable power, based on the public credit, 
since massive loans could be contracted at a relatively low rates of 
interest, and thus troops could be paid on time. However, little is 
known about the degree to which the system was actually continued in 
the eighteenth century, so the paper addresses this central question 
about the performance in that period. 
The author enters first into a description and comparison of the 
basic features of both Dutch and English financial revolutions but, in 
order to establish the extent to which the financial system of the 
eighteenth century built upon earlier innovations it is important to 
know in detail what kind of loans and what kind of creditors formed 
the financial revolution of the seventeenth century. So in the core of 
the paper the author studies in detail such matters as long term or short 
term loans, the social status of the persons investing in them, the 
presence of women, and so on. With such information it is then 
possible to undertake a comparison with Britain during the eighteenth 
century, and it can be seen that the Dutch and British financial 
revolutions shared important characteristics: both were able to draw 
upon massive loans to pay the costs of war and could doing it without 
causing structural damage to public credit. The trust of the public in 
the government was high and both systems were supported by an 
enormous number of domestic creditors. Both states could serve their 
debt interest out of an efficient tax system, and both had stock markets 
that supported the system by stimulating the free trade in government 
bonds. 
Yet, Hart insists that there were some crucial differences. 
Comparing loans, the amount of the British loans was much higher 
than those of the Dutch and they were subscribed in the open market, 
whereas the larger Dutch loans were subscribed by institutions. The 
British state relied more upon financial consortia and intermediaries. 
                                                      
3 M. 't HART, “Mobilising resources for war in eighteenth century 
Netherlands. The Dutch financial revolution in comparative perspective”. 
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All these factors enabled the British state to generate more money, 
and funds were acquired more efficiently and at greater speed.  
Furthermore, the Bank of England was a credit institution dedicated to 
raising money for the state, whereas the Bank of Amsterdam served 
primarily the interests of the local trading community. In the same 
way, the English state also used joint-stock companies to mobilise 
funds for war, whereas the Dutch colonial capital remained in private 
hands. 
Typically, the British financial revolution rested upon the 
wealthier commercial and financial groups in society, whereas in the 
Netherlands support shifted to higher political officers during the 
eighteenth century. Another difference was the degree of foreign 
investors who were much more evident in Britain than in Holland. 
Peculiarly, Dutch investors in British funds helped to maintain low 
rates of interest at some crucial moments during the eighteenth 
century. 
For the explanation of these differences we can take into 
account the fact that the British system emerged during the late 
seventeenth century when the stock market was much more mature 
and could build upon the experiences of others. The Dutch system of 
public credit continued to develop along the same lines and it failed to 
grasp the new opportunities. Besides, the centralised nature of the 
British system should be contrasted with Dutch decentralisation, or 
even worse, the dependency on the Amsterdam capital market, which 
turned into a disadvantage when the Netherlands came into a split 
with political division among provinces. Nevertheless, if the Dutch 
system can look quite obsolete against the British one, it was not so in 
comparison with other countries. The Dutch financial system helped 
to maintain the independence of the country and it ensured that the 
Dutch had strong credit with other European countries during most of 
the eighteenth century. 
Grubb's paper shows a different aspect of the financial 
revolution which, for the years at the end of the early modern period, 
made the United States of America a different case from which we are 
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used to in Europe4. In short, the goal of this paper is to use a net asset 
position model of government to incorporate the full financial effects 
of the land assets acquired via war and the defaulting on the non-
interesting bearing war debt. While the current literature focuses on 
the funding of the U.S. interest-bearing war debt via a British-
modelled financial revolution, this paper tries to take into account 
other factors and so more fully gauge the ramifications of how the 
U.S. funded its war of independence. 
As the author says, the U.S. financed its war of independence 
from Great Britain (1775-1783) largely through issuing fiat paper 
money (inflation tax confiscation), the direct confiscation of goods, 
and borrowing via interest-bearing loans. At independence (1783) the 
U.S. interest-bearing war debt stood at 62 million dollars. Through the 
non-payment of interest and principal this debt rose to 77 million 
dollars by 1790. The new U.S. Constitution (adopted in 1789) allowed 
the first Federalist administration, largely through the leadership of 
Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, to restructure U.S. 
government finances along the British model. Fiat paper money was 
constitutionally banned and Hamilton created the First Bank of the 
U.S. in 1791 that was explicitly modelled on the Bank of England. 
Hamilton turned the U.S. war debt into de facto perpetuities —again 
along the British model— fully funding interest payments but not 
paying the principal. By 1802 the war debt still stood at 77 million 
dollars, but it traded at face value, and the U.S. government was 
considered to have an excellent credit rating in European capital 
markets. Many scholars view this as the U.S. financial revolution that 
created, along the British model, a solvent and powerful national 
government that through its large-scale issuance of “safe” securities 
helped create, for the first time in the U.S., a national securities 
market where capital could be marshalled both privately and publicly. 
That the national war debt was supposedly turned into this national 
blessing is sometimes called Hamilton’s miracle or Hamilton’s 
blessing. 
                                                      
4 F. GRUBB, “The Net Asset Position of the U.S. National 
Government, 1784-1802: Hamilton's Blessing or the Spoils of War”. 
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The above interpretation is challenged in this paper by 
estimating, for the first time anywhere, the net asset position of the 
U.S. government coming out of the war of independence through to 
1802. The interesting-bearing war debt (above) is well known. What 
is sometimes forgotten, however, is that between 1784 and 1802 the 
U.S. government also acquired an empire of land —233 million acres 
between borders of the original 13 colonies and the Mississippi river. 
These lands were the spoils of war in the Treaty of Paris which 
granted the U.S. independence from Britain. When these land assets 
are included in a net liabilities estimate, the U.S. government was 
solvent. The excellent crediting rating of the U.S. government after 
1790 may have had more to do with land-asset-backing –the spoils of 
war– than with any British-modelled Hamiltonian financial 
revolution.  
In addition, the time-path of the solvency position of the U.S. 
government is tracked over time from 1784 through to 1802. This 
shows that the most important issue on the liabilities side enabling the  
U.S. government to achieve solvency was not the British-modelled 
Hamiltonian financial plan for handling the interest-bearing war debt, 
but was the defaulting on the non-interesting-bearing governmental 
bills of credit issued during the war (in direct violation of the new 
U.S. Constitution). If there was a Hamiltonian miracle it was getting 
away with defaulting on these national government financial claims 
without apparently damaging the future creditworthiness of the 
national government. 
So, through calculation of a net asset position Grubb has shown 
us that other possibilities than a British-modelled financial revolution 
existed, at least until the end of the eighteenth century, to solve the 
problem of servicing the debt. The author stresses the importance 
given by the government to maintain external credit. This possibility 
was land, although the government had to negotiate with each state 
the use of that land for servicing the debt. As in Sweden, but in a 
different way, land as a security supported financial management and 
gave solvency to the government. 
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The Spanish case, as presented by Torres Sánchez5, is another 
example of the use of “other possibilities” which in this case is related 
to a different fiscal structure. Torres tests the possibilities of the 
Spanish fiscal-military state in comparison with Great Britain. In both 
cases, war was understood as the fundamental function of the state, 
both countries devoted the greatest amount of their revenues to 
finance war oriented activities, and both countries developed an 
institutional transformation in terms of centralisation and government 
control. There were though some differences. In Spain, expenditure on 
the military was continuous but much lower than in Great Britain (less 
than 40% of the British figures) and Spain spent more on the army 
than on the navy. In Britain, military expenditure in peace time was 
lowered, but with the war the expenses grew to at least triple the 
peace-time rate. War was a real catalyst for the financial effort, which 
was increasingly more directed to the navy than to the army. 
The most important differences between the two states rest in 
the fiscal structure which in the Spanish case placed a constraint upon 
the state’s capacity to react to conflict. Great Britain was able to 
increase its revenues through increments in the excise duties and 
thanks to the public debt, whereas in Spain the only real possibilities 
of increasing its revenues lay in trade and monopolies like tobacco 
and American precious metals, especially silver. But in time of war 
trade was interrupted, so this important source of extra revenues could 
not be fully exploited. Before the 1779-83 war, Spanish governments 
could draw on money hoarded during moments of peace, but by 1779 
all this treasure had been spent. That is the reason why Spain fell back 
on to use of public debt, and Torres argues that this was not the 
culmination of the development of a fiscal-military state, but rather a 
temporary solution to a financial crisis. 
As a conclusion, Spain can be regarded as a fiscal-military state 
–very well organised with respect to the institutions, and not 
arbitrarily governed– but with a limited capacity to enhance its 
revenues since it was not possible for it to increase its excise duties, as 
                                                      
5 R. TORRES SÁNCHEZ, “Possibilities and limits: testing the fiscal 
military state in the Anglo-Spanish war of 1779-1783”. 
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Britain did. Spanish governments were expecting that American silver 
arrived at particular moments to compensate for the funding deficit 
and they did not want to incur heavy expenses nor did they try to 
innovate more extensively in the fiscal system. Even so, this 
organisation of things worked reasonably well until the 1790s. 
A second group of contributions refers more specifically to 
problems of tax revenues and expenditure. O'Brien6 deals with a 
problem which emerged in Britain at the end of the eighteenth century 
when new war commitments not only demanded more money but also 
needed new ideas and adaptation to a changing situation. In this case, 
the solution represented a departure from the classic British funding 
scheme: no more debt, but a higher rate of tax on customs and excise 
and, in particular, the introduction of a new income tax. 
According to O’Brien, at the start of the French Wars, the taxes 
available to the British state fell mainly on domestically produced 
commodities and services, the total amounting to nearly £18 million a 
year. Between 1793 and 1815 the government appropriated a further 
£12.6 million per annum in constant prices. Where did this extra 
money come from? The answer is that 55% of the new total net 
income came from changes in the rate of existing taxes and 36% came 
from new taxes, especially the income tax imposed in 1799, which 
alone amounted 28.5% of the total. Most new taxes were introduced 
without much political opposition. More difficult was the introduction 
of the income tax. The author studies in detail the process of 
introduction of this new tax remarking on the political difficulties, the 
problem of breaking from a tradition of not taxing properties, the 
process of implementation, and the fact that the new tax sought to tax 
the wealthy and thus contained an element of fiscal progression. The 
yield was not large at the beginning, but successive amendments to 
the law, reforms to the administration and the upward trend in 
nominal money incomes made the tax the most productive tax of the 
moment. Since it was virtually a property tax, especially a land tax, 
                                                      
6 P. K. O'BRIEN, “The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal 
State: Taxation for the Wars against  Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 
1793-1815”. 
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wartime agrarian prosperity helped to make the income tax very 
productive for the state and reasonable to the landed interest.  
Alongside the need for money was the requirement for better 
administration. During the war years, fiscal administration improved 
in several details, but the author remarks that traditional defects and 
inefficiencies of the fiscal organisation remained after 1815. 
The other important issue addressed in the paper is the 
economic and social incidence of war taxation. Recent evidence 
suggests that during the war years the national economy grew at a 
slower pace than during the years previous to 1793 and after 1821, 
and this implies that the Industrial Revolution had only a limited 
impact on the tax base. Even in the decades previous to 1793, income 
from taxes increased because chancellors deployed political and 
administrative policies to extend the state's capacity to tax. This 
capacity was high even during war time years because part of the 
income and new taxes introduced after 1793 fell upon incomes, goods, 
and services experiencing growth. In view of this, the relevant 
question is: what forces operated to maintain production and 
consumption at surprisingly high levels? Nevertheless, since many 
rapidly growing industries escaped taxation, the relationship between 
industrialisation and war finance probably occurred more in terms of 
its effects on the general level of demand than through taxes affecting 
the expanding sectors of the economy. Alterations in the economic 
and social structure made possible changes in patterns of demand 
which worked in favour of an elasticity of the kingdom's fiscal base in 
the sense of a shift from excise on one product or the substitute. 
Rising excise duties prompted manufacturers to export, since 
exportation was not taxed, but with Napoleon's blockade 
manufacturers oriented themselves to domestic markets, thus helping 
government taxation. 
From the point of view of social impact, rates of duty upon 
commodities consumed largely by the poor generally speaking 
remained constant and, with exceptions, tax rates on commodities 
consumed by affluent classes appear to have increased. O’Brien’s 
"statistical conjectures" suggest that up to 60 per cent of all additional 
tax revenue to wage war probably came from the more affluent classes 
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of the society. This does not imply that the richer classes contributed a 
progressively rising proportion of their income. 
In general terms, the years 1793-1815 marked a departure from 
the previous tendency to shift additional taxes required in wartime on 
to industrial commodities and commercial services. In these years, the 
share collected from levies on industry and trade declined, while there 
was a rise in the proportion collected in form of taxes on income and 
wealth. Nevertheless, the period was also a time when agriculture may 
finally have paid an increasing proportion of the costs of a major war. 
On the subject of expenditures, the contribution of Jurado 
Sánchez7 is important since it is the first time that we have a complete 
annual series of expenditure for eighteenth-century Spain, and this 
now enables long-term comparisons to be made with other countries. 
In Jurados' figures we see a continuous increase in Spanish 
expenditure. Spanish spending at constant prices grew at an average 
annual rate of 0.45 between 1714 and 1800. Of course, this rate was 
very irregular; the moments of the largest increments coincided with 
war periods, when the increment could be more than 40 per cent 
greater than in the peace years, and this marked the priority of military 
expenses in the budget.  
The considerable financial requirements of the first half of the 
eighteenth century could be met thanks to the growth of the economy, 
following population expansion and the increase of demand, and to 
some reforms, like the modifications in the fiscal systems of the 
kingdoms of Aragón. During the second half of the century, armed 
conflicts were again the main source of expenditure, but by the 1780s 
the main part of the rise in the revenue could not be met through 
economic growth alone. New sources of income were looked for and 
the most important of them were the issue of vales reales which were 
a form of national debt. 
                                                      
7 J. JURADO SÁNCHEZ, “The Spanish National Budget in a Century of 
War. The Treasury Impact of Military Spending During the Eighteenth 
Century”. 
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The moment of highest spending was the period of the 
Revolutionary Wars, from 1793 onwards. Between 1793 and 1800, 
spending was 55 per cent greater than in the previous decade. The 
Army and Navy got a 73 per cent of the increase in the expenditures 
and the principal sources for it were extraordinary loans and National 
Debt. 
Taking the period as a whole, the average spending on the 
Army and Navy from 1717 to 1800 was 60.3 per cent of the total, or 
73 per cent if we include the National Debt because it was a form of 
deferred military spending. The per capita spending rose from 24.4 at 
the beginning of the period, to 34.3 at the end of the century.  
Nevertheless, not all spending was military, since civil expenditure 
also grew in the last third of the century. 
With regard to the military items (Army and Navy), the Army 
was the most expensive item of the budget in every decade of the 
century, even if its proportion experienced a reduction through the 
century. The most costly corps of the Army was infantry (59%), and 
service corps and logistics accounted on average for a third of the total 
costs of the Army. The Navy was gaining in budgetary importance 
through the century, from 9 per cent of the total expenditure at the 
beginning of the century, to a level of about 25 per cent from the 
1740s, but the percentage of naval spending was usually a little lower 
than the Army percentage. 
The paper by Solbes Ferri8 tries to explain how the money 
collected from taxes reached the army, and it addresses the problem of 
administrative organisation and financial effectiveness. The chain was 
like this: the provincial tax revenue administrators, who received the 
yield of taxes in each province, had to send the money to the General 
Treasurer in Madrid, and then this high official would earmark the 
money for the Army provincial treasurers. The money could be sent in 
                                                      
8 S. SOLBES FERRI, “Territorial Availability of Financial Resources of 
the Spanish Royal Finances: The Army Treasuries of the Kingdoms of the 
Crown of Aragón (1755-1765)”. 
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coins, which was not the most usual way in the eighteenth century, or 
by means of credit instruments. 
Solbes studies the particular cases of the Army treasurers of the 
provinces of the old kingdoms of the Crown of Aragón, where, 
according to the author, 77 per cent of the money received by the 
army treasurers actually came from the yield of taxes collected in the 
same province. The other 23 per cent of the Army treasurer’s income 
came from money sent directly by the General Treasurer in Madrid, or 
from transfers from other Army treasurers, or even from royal 
patrimony in the province. With respect to the income from yield 
taxes, the most important tax was the equivalente, a direct tax 
introduced by the Crown of Aragón with the reforms made by Philip 
V during the War of Spanish Succession. This tax amounted for 
almost half of the total of the income, the other half coming from 
custom taxes and monopolies (namely tobacco and salt). 
 What we can see in this paper is how more and more, the 
money collected by the provincial tax revenue administrators was 
handed out directly to the correspondent provincial army treasurer and 
the General Treasurer would approve the delivery afterwards. This 
procedure meant that the tax system became militarized, not only in 
quantity, but in the administrative practice as well.  Since most of the 
yield of the taxes was supposed to go to the army, army treasurers 
who administered the payments needed to have a priority, so the 
payments chain was organised in such a way that the money could 
reach the army treasurers as soon as possible. Solbes' paper is 
interesting because is the first detailed study we have of the army 
treasurers, a key figure in the chain for the supply of money to the 
army. 
Another very different problem is posed by Conway9 whose 
paper deals with the important question of controlling state 
expenditure. Control could be a way to effect greater efficiency in the 
spending of money, and this is a subject about which very little is 
                                                      
9 S. CONWAY, “Cheking and Controlling British Military Expenditure, 
1739-1783”. 
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known. According to Conway, the first general element performing a 
controlling function was public opinion. There is abundant evidence 
that public opinion was becoming significant in British politics during 
the eighteenth century and military spending was an important 
element within the debate conducted in the public sphere. 
The elements of the public debate were many, from different 
aspects of taxation to the sustainability of the national debt. The very 
existence of the regular army was resented by many because of 
financial concerns. A consistent objection was to the alleged 
squandering of public money on foreign allies, especially German 
troops. The army’s commissaries and contractors were attacked no 
less frequently on the grounds that they had exploited their positions 
to appropriate part of the military budget. 
The second element in the control of expenditure was 
Parliament. Contemporary opinion regarded the House of Commons 
as a vital check to the executive, especially in controlling government 
expenditure. Individual MPs raised concerns on many occasions, but 
the parliamentary events most likely to stimulate discussion of 
military questions were the presentation of the army estimates and 
accounts of the army's extraordinary expenditure. On those occasions 
the topics discussed could be very varied, and they included the 
excessive profits of the contractors, the money handed out to foreign 
troops and commanders, or any situation considered to be a threat to 
the public interest. 
 Parliament's greatest success came with the appointment of 
commissioners to examine the public accounts in 1780, but MPs were 
not very effective in controlling military expenditure in this way; first, 
because this commission, though approved by Parliament, was 
promoted by the government; and, second, because MPs were 
probably unable to make much sense of military accounts which 
contained many complicated details. There were also political 
obstructionism and, at times, voting was conducted in a hasty way 
without careful examination of particular cases. The political 
background of the accounts was more important for the MPs than the 
figures themselves, and when expected political issues did not 
materialise MPs often seem to have allowed the army's estimates and 
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extraordinaries without much adverse comment. This is not to say that 
Parliament was an ineffectual check, since there were members who 
scrutinised figures very carefully and made motions or recommen-
dations accordingly, but it was not as effective as an optimistic 
constitutional theory supposed. 
And, finally, the third element in the control of public 
expenditure lay in the administration itself. In fact, the most effective 
checks to military expenditure were offered by the different agencies 
of the state. The monarchs, in the first place, introduced on crown 
authority a whole host of reforms relating to military finance. The key 
changes were the ending of the practices putting fictitious names on 
regimental rolls. For its part, the Treasury supervised through 
commissaries all other supplies not contracted by the colonels of 
regiments. It was the Treasury, furthermore, that initiated inquiry into 
improper practices in the army's ancillary services. This is not to say 
that every corrupted practice disappeared altogether; besides, the state 
agencies were not operating in a political vacuum since the 
chancellors were aware of potential parliamentary attack, but there 
was also a real concern for economy that seems to have been 
generated from within the Treasury itself. 
How successful were these controls when considered 
collectively? Some recent research tells us that the most remarkable 
feature of the contracting system was not corruption, but inefficiency 
and that fraud was comparatively rare. In spite of this, however, 
Conway points out that controlling the army at home was much easier 
than doing so when it was abroad. The scale of abuse and peculation 
is impossible to judge, but there are some compelling indications of 
fortunes having been made and thus, for all the efforts made, there 
does appear to have been significant fraud and waste in military 
expenditure. Nevertheless, very important comparisons could be made 
with the checks and controls that existed in other armies of the time. 
A final group of six papers look beyond the fiscal-military state 
to consider how powers drew on and made use of extra-European 
resources; and how they then organised the projection of military and 
naval power into the wider world. With one exception, the papers in 
this group relate to Britain, but the issues raised can inform analysis of 
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how all states harnessed resources and organised for war far beyond 
Europe. Thus the focus might be on the ‘British way in war’, but we 
need to know more about whether all states instinctively attempted to 
act in more or less the same way, but were then constrained in their 
military actions by the size and variety of the resources at their 
disposal, by the geographical distance at which they stood from 
overseas theatres of conflict, and by the relationships they had with 
private agencies. 
Building on previous work, Cuenca Esteban undertakes a 
detailed quantitative examination of the fiscal contribution made to 
the British state by the regulated Asiatic trade conducted by the 
monopolistic East India Company10. Instead of focusing, as most 
historians have done, on intermittent or ad hoc contributions to the 
state made by the Company, Cuenca explores the extent to which 
customs ands excise payments on East India goods represented the 
most routine and regular contributions to national war efforts. Among 
a range of important statistics, the headline figure produced by his 
calculations is that over a long period of extraordinary growth in 
revenue, the share of Britain’s tax income represented by duties on 
Asian goods stood moved narrowly around 10 per cent of the total. 
This in itself is important as a vital constant component of government 
income, but equally interesting is that the fiscal burden on the Asia 
trade was far greater than the shipping tonnage and volume of trade 
might lead us to expect; a circumstance arising from the fact that 
Asian goods usually carried duties that were much greater than those 
imposed on goods imported from elsewhere in the world. This is 
explained through an examination of the commodity profile which, 
despite the identification of some important moderating influences, 
nevertheless generally points up heavy duties on teas and Indian 
foodstuffs, and in part this is explained by the preferential treatment 
secured by Atlantic merchants for goods such as sugar and coffee that 
were increasingly found in the East India as well as the West India 
trade. One implication to be drawn from this, of course, is that rates of 
commercial tariff could be set less according to the overriding 
                                                      
10 J. CUENCA ESTEBAN, “Fiscal and Military Dimensions of Britain’s 
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financial strategic goals of governments, and more as a result of 
political pressure exerted by powerful commercial lobby groups, such 
as the West India interest. 
This gives rise to a series of questions that can be asked about 
the specific influences and interests that were shaping ministerial 
policy-making on fiscal matters at any given moment in time. But 
what has Cuenca has shown very clearly is that, in financial terms, the 
British state derived far greater support from the East India trade than 
it ever received directly from the territorial revenues of the 
Company’s expanding Indian empire. The overriding question is thus 
whether this was achieved through the implementation of a carefully 
thought out policy, or whether it came about almost by accident. In 
other words, as with so much else in the EIC’s relationship with the 
state, was the fiscal contribution, large and important though it 
undoubtedly was, made by the East India trade ultimately based upon 
a series of ad hoc arrangements which actually had little to do with 
informed development of an integrated imperial economic policy. 
Lenk also looks at the utilisation of resources generated by 
trade and empire, but whereas Cuenca has focused on the general 
contribution to the domestic war-making capacity of a European state, 
he examines how locally generated resources were deployed locally in 
order to meet the threat posed by another colonial power11. As such 
we are presented with a very detailed account of how in practical 
terms the Portuguese countered Dutch aggression in Salvador in South 
America during the first half of the seventeenth century. In particular, 
we are told how the key garrison of Bahia was supported by finances 
and supplies garnered from local sources, and Lenk maps out how ad 
hoc local taxes became permanent, and were then supplemented by 
extraordinary measures at times of crisis. He shows through analysis 
of local commercial policy where the burden of taxation fell in the 
colony, and this underpins discussion of local political relationships 
and the influence exerted by local interest groups. 
                                                      
11 W. LENK, “State and Warfare in Portuguese Brazil During the Dutch 
War (!624-1654)”. 
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Much of the paper addresses the perennial problem faced by all 
of the European colonial powers: how were colonies to be made to 
pay for their own defence without fuelling local political hostility. But 
as far as the main themes of the session were concerned, what is of 
interest is that the central government in Lisbon does not loom at all 
large in this paper. Instead, much responsibility was devolved upon 
the local administration and it was that which devised fiscal policy. 
There seems always to have been the vague hope that the enhanced 
garrison would be underwritten in some way by the Crown, but this 
did not happen. More needs to be known about this arrangement, and 
the principles, if any, upon which it was based.  Does it arise from a 
general model of Portuguese colonial administration or simply from a 
pragmatic view of circumstances in which it was felt that local sources 
of finance and supply were sufficient for the task at hand? Equally 
interesting is the level of autonomy exercised by the local 
administration, notably in its dealings with the government backed 
General Company of Commerce to Brazil, and in view of this and 
other independent lines of action, it would also be interesting to know 
more about how those in Lisbon brought the colony in line with what 
were seen to be the wider strategic interests of the empire. Or did they 
simply rely upon the Dutch threat to remind the colonists of where, 
ultimately, their loyalties should lie? 
Stern examines how precisely the EIC came to be central to the 
growth of Britain’s fiscal-military state, but in a strongly revisionist 
analysis he does not see the seventeenth century EIC as being either 
subordinate to, or an extension of, the English state12. By eschewing a 
teleological approach which sees the state remorselessly and 
effortlessly gathering in or extorting private resources, Stern looks in 
detail at working out of state-Company relationships, and throws 
down a robust challenge to received wisdom by asking who in fact 
held the upper hand in the relationship.  The core of the analysis is 
devoted to the 1690s, which is seen a key decade when turbulent 
political circumstances, and especially pressures from rivals and the 
emergence of a parliamentary state, saw a shift away from a situation 
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the Fiscal Politics of Co-option, 16570-1757”. 
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in which the Company largely dictated financial relations with the 
state on its own terms to one in which it was expected routinely and 
formally to contribute to the nation’s pool of resources. As is set out 
in great detail, the Company’s corporate outlook and actions of the 
1680s were very different from those of the 1720s, and Stern alerts us 
to the danger of applying an unchanging template to Company-state 
relations over the long run. 
Most important of all, Stern underlines the extent to which, 
before the relative stability of the eighteenth-century regime, the 
state’s gathering of private  resources did not take place according to 
some grand, coherent scheme, but instead was dependent upon the 
interplay of a host of unpredictable political variables. In this case, the 
‘co-option’ of the East India Company was neither straightforward nor 
inevitable, but in the face of the evidence marshalled by Stern no-one 
could deny that the events of the 1690s had ‘rapidly reoriented the 
role of East Indian affairs in England’. What is unclear, however, is 
the extent to which the events of the 1690s had similarly reoriented 
the role of all chartered enterprises in England. Clearly, there was 
much that was unique about the role and resources of the EIC, but was 
the parliamentary state, under the acute pressure of war, simply 
working out a new set of relationships with all its major commercial 
partners. Were, to a lesser or greater degree, other companies and 
institutions finding themselves also formally co-opted so that they too 
became an arm of the state? Are we in danger of paying too much 
attention to the EIC, and thus ignoring a wider realignment of private-
public interests? 
Paul does in fact look beyond the EIC to the Royal African and 
South Sea Companies, and thus she also considers the interface 
between private and public enterprise, although she rightly prefaces 
her remarks by pointing out that in the mercantilist era modern 
distinctions between the public and the private do not easily apply13. 
Her focus is, however, on working relationships between the two 
companies and the Royal Navy, and she sees the three forming part of 
                                                      
13 H.J. PAUL, “Joint-Stock Companies as the Sinews of War: The 
South Sea and Royal African Companies”. 
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an ‘integrated system’ as if all were part of the state’s apparatus which 
underpinned its Blue Water Strategy. In the financial sphere, the 
companies acted to service the navy’s debts, but Helen argues that co-
operation between all three was habitual and she demonstrates that in 
a good number of ways resources were often shared, in peacetime as 
well as war, after the South Sea Bubble of 1720. 
As with Stern, this paper demonstrates the extent to which the 
state routinely drew on private resources, but what is stressed here is 
the element of partnership which in relatively simple ways enabled the 
companies to derive benefit from their close working relationship with 
the navy. This again raises the question of where the line is drawn 
between the public and private, and in addressing this issue Paul sees 
the status of the companies as not really being private companies at all 
but rather ‘quasi-public enterprises’. Yet, with the companies in 
theory being joint-stock concerns with shareholders one wonders how 
co-operation was achieved when, as must have happened from time to 
time, there was a marked divergence between the interest of a 
company and the interest of the navy. Surely, this was not a 
relationship in which all parties were equal partners in a joint 
endeavour, and thus more information is needed on how, and by 
whom, this ‘integrated system’ was ultimately regulated and 
controlled. Were relationships of an ad hoc nature worked out at local 
level, or were they based on strategic decisions negotiated and 
implemented at the centre, by ministers and company directors? And 
on a number of occasions, it is noted that the two companies seem to 
have secured privileges that were not extended to the EIC. Why was 
this so, in view of the fact that it too could be considered as a partner 
in a joint endeavour? 
In mapping out a research agenda for an important new project 
Knight places victualling, or the supply of the Royal Navy, at the very 
heart of the processes that enabled Britain to project maritime power 
on a global scale by the end of the period under review14. 
Interestingly, given the greater number of colonies and territories 
coming under British control, it seems that the navy was still heavily 
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dependent on the supply of provisions from London, which is a useful 
reminder that imperial acquisitions did not necessarily ease the burden 
of supporting a world-wide war effort. Clearly, in view of the size of 
the task in hand, the coordinating efforts of the Victualling Board 
were of central importance to this complex operation, but much more 
evidently needs to be known about the Board’s relationships with, and 
the operations of, the merchant contractors. 
Certainly the measure of performance will be a formidable task 
for the reasons outlined in the paper, and getting past the high profile 
cases of scandal and corruption will be important if a working 
definition of ‘normal’ service is to be established. But this promises 
much, and the concept of ‘contractor state’ offers much because it has 
the potential to have applications in many different contexts. Clearly, 
the model being established is born out of Britain’s particular 
administrative and commercial circumstances, but since every state is, 
to a lesser or greater degree, a ‘contractor state’, and a comparative 
dimension is essential to an understanding of different paths of 
development among the European states. 
Also, in the working of the contractor state, it is intriguing that 
it was the contractors themselves who were dominating decision-
making in local centres of power far away from the administrative 
heart of the fiscal-military state in London. Detailed examples are 
needed of this, because if it was the case then it would seem that in 
practical terms the reach of the state was very much being was being 
restrained by private interest groups, no matter what the ambitions and 
goals of those at the centre who were planning and acting in the 
national interest. This has very important implications for discussions 
where the real locus or loci of power lay in the British imperial state. 
Following on from this, Harding does in fact focus very much 
on the heart of the state by examining how ministers prepared for a 
transoceanic expedition, but then abandoned it15. A case-study of a 
proposed expedition to Canada in 1746 is used to explore the 
                                                      
15 R. HARDING, “An Expedition to Canada 1746: The Ideology and 
Organisation of Maritime Warfare”. 
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development of the means by which a network of factors was 
translated resources into effective military power. The key question 
posed is: at a time when the ministerial grasp on knowledge and 
information was often only limited and partial, how had the state 
managed to develop the capacity to bring real resources into line with 
the political vision of the conduct of the war, as appears to have 
happened in Britain by 1759. 
In addressing this matter, a generally favourable assessment is 
made of the planning, organisation, and logistical arrangements that 
lay behind the proposed expedition of 1746; in other words, the 
factors that lay within the direct control of ministers. What is evident 
however is that a combination of other uncontrollable factors –the 
actions of the French fleet, unsuitable weather, and uncertainty about 
the mobilisation of local American forces– was sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the belief that the operation could be brought 
to a successful conclusion. Yet, as Harding argues, while the standing 
down of the expedition in the early summer of 1746 could be seen as a 
failure, it was not translated into an all-consuming political crisis; and 
this in itself demonstrated how, in contrast to earlier debacles, ‘the 
ideology of maritime war’ had become resistant to failure. Thus, it is 
argued, the expedition of 1746 has importance as a staging post in the 
fusing together of the ideology and organisation of maritime war, a 
process which underpinned the upward drift of the state’s operational 
capability. 
Harding’s case-study invites analysis of other operations that 
were never actually launched –those that did not advance beyond the 
planning stage or those that were diverted away from their intended 
purpose– with a view to assessing the points of no return when 
ministers were sufficiently confident to believe that the immediate 
circumstances of operations pointed to eventual success. 
Harding’s paper also points to an aspect of the private-public 
relationship not touched on elsewhere, because he frames his 
discussion with a reminder that the state was often in possession of 
very little knowledge or information about its own military capability. 
In Britain much information was in the hands of private individuals, 
which created obvious problems, so knowledge gained from failed 
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ventures such as the operation of 1746 had the potential to offer much 
to the state, but this could only be achieved within a bureaucracy that 
had developed an institutional memory, and which could retrieve 
plans and blueprints from its own archives. It is unclear when this 
developed into a system that existed beyond the lifetime of individual 
ministers, but it needs to be considered as a means towards the more 
effective mobilisation of resources over time. 
Taken together, the papers allow for general observations to be 
made on the mobilisation of resources in early modern Europe, and 
they generate important questions that help to map out an agenda for 
future research activity. 
First, it is evident that the analysis of fiscal-military state is all 
about the study of institutions, but there are different kinds of them: 
political, administrative, and economic. All of them underpin 
government activity, but they play different roles. As we have seen, 
the administrative dimension seems more important than the political 
or even the economic, at least until mid eighteenth century, roughly 
speaking. The importance of a good administration in Britain and in 
Spain, each with so different political regimes, or of Sweden in the 
seventeenth century, stresses the relevance of well managed 
institutions, even more than politics. 
But the political ability of individuals was also a fundamental 
factor influencing the successful mobilisation of resources. The ability 
of Swedish politicians in the seventeenth century, or of Hamilton in 
the U.S., were important for the success of their countries. In the U.S 
case, Hamilton's blessings would have not been possible without a 
political negotiation between the government of the nation, the 
Congress and the states, for the government to obtain land, sell it and 
use that money to serve the debt. 
Both in Britain and in Spain the work of particular ministers 
was also of great importance. So, the persons, either in particular 
(ministers, kings), or in groups (members of parliaments, members of 
social or professional groups), had a great significance in the 
development of the fiscal-military states. What may surprise us is that 
the effective economic control was exerted in fact by the bodies of the 
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administration, and in particular by the Treasury. It is true that 
governments were more or less pressed by the fact that a political 
control existed (in the form of Parliament or political factions), but 
more than that, people in the government did have an economic 
concern, a desire for effectiveness. In this respect, Conway's study 
shows the importance of a mature administration, improving itself 
simply because it has to or because governments needed and 
demanded that improvement to reach their political goals. But that 
was true also in a non-parliamentary regime like Spain. Modernisation 
and professionalisation were concepts implied in the administrative 
machines of the early modern states, no matter the political regime 
was. Conway poses also the problem of where the control of resources 
most effectively lay: with representative bodies or the political 
authorities. The answer here seems to be the authority; the 
administration improved from within and reforms were pushed 
forward by the Parliament. 
But economic institutions were also very important. We already 
know the difference between the role played by the Bank of England, 
the Bank of Amsterdam or the Riksbank in Sweden. The work of all 
of them was related to respective capital markets, although they were 
working for the government in different ways, and with different 
success. 
And of course resources must exist in the first place before they 
can be mobilised by the state. So another important point discussed in 
these papers is the source of revenue. Debt has been pointed out as the 
best money resource, and there is a long history behind that. But 
Torres points out that, at least for eighteenth century Spanish 
Exchequer, debt was not the culmination of the evolution of the fiscal-
military state, but something needed at a particular moment. Debt was 
not enough in the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, maybe 
because necessary changes were not implemented, and even in Britain 
in 1799 ministers preferred not to incur more debt, for the moment. 
On the other hand Sweden was active again to the international capital 
market from 1766. So, debt was an integral part of the fiscal-military 
state, but does not seem to have been a key component. 
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These papers identify the great variety of resources needed by 
states, with the variety being used according to the countries’ fiscal 
traditions, the range of fiscal schemes, and the ability to change from 
one resource to another, when necessary. The ability to do that was an 
indicator of the success of the fiscal military state.  But this ability has 
also a quantitative check to it.  In this respect what is really impressive 
is the much superior capacity of Britain in terms of the growth of 
indebtedness and expenditure, particularly in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, at least if we compare Britain with the evidence 
relating to Spain and the Netherlands presented in these papers. The 
fact is that Britain was able to generate more money for waging war 
than did her rivals. Was this capacity based on the elasticity of the 
country's fiscal base, as suggested by O'Brien? In fact, if the industrial 
revolution was not a direct cause of an increase in fiscal capacities at 
the times of large-scale conflicts, the economic growth previous to 
that could be the prerequisite necessary for enhanced fiscal capability. 
From this point of view, the economic growth of Britain during the 
century was a base for the increment of the purchasing power of the 
people, and thus for its capability as a fiscal subject. 
A further question related to the fiscal military-state concept is 
that related to different levels of successes experienced by the 
European powers. Not all fiscal-military states were successful, and 
thus does failure call into questions a state’s position as a fiscal-
military state? Countries other than Britain made their way: the 
Netherlands, and maybe Sweden, resisted and survived; Spain was 
still a great power at least until 1797, maybe until 1808. So those 
systems were successful in different ways, although they finally found 
their limit. Since a fiscal-military state is ultimately tested in armed 
confrontation, the limits of each fiscal-military states were related to 
the resource mobilisation capacity of the enemy state. 
The most important questions therefore are why was Britain so 
consistently successful during the eighteenth century, and why were 
her enemies were not capable of such a performance? These questions 
make us consider the wider perspective, the whole organisation of the 
society and economy, and indeed relationships with the wider-world. 
Britain seems to have had a better access to capital markets, a richer 
society, and a higher social class more identified with the interests of 
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the government and willing to invest in the financial market to the 
ultimate benefit of the state. 
When in the second part of the eighteenth century a much 
greater economic effort was demanded of states, the only possible way 
to meet all the increasing pressures was to secure the active 
collaboration of more people. The British social model is one which 
seems to have permitted the participation of more persons in the 
gathering of resources, and the political system was the most inclusive 
in terms of political and economic participation. With weak 
institutional barriers in Britain it was possible to secure the integration 
of private and public economies. A strong government and a free 
economy, a trust in market forces, gave Britain, in the end, a more 
flexible mercantile and industrial economy that responded when it was 
necessary. If British citizens supported the heaviest tax burden in 
Europe it means that they were also the richest citizen of Europe. Only 
an affluent society could generate and deploy resources on the scale 
that Britain did over a long period of time. 
It also seems evident from these papers that Britain was 
successful in her attempts to gather resources from, and then deploy 
them in, the wider world. But, in a comparative context, we need to 
know much more about the extent to which Britain’s rivals were able 
(or unable) to utilise extra-European resources to war efforts. Lenk 
has shown us how the Portuguese were able to shore up a fragile 
position in South America, by drawing on local resources, in both a 
regular and ad hoc fashion. It seems desirable that we havea more 
rigorous analysis of the potential overseas resources that were 
available, directly and indirectly, to all of the European powers, 
together with a measure of how, and with what effectiveness, those 
resources were then harnessed by the various states. 
There is a distinction to be drawn between the state’s direct 
wartime use of overseas resources –i.e. manpower and tax revenues– 
and the indirect strengthening of the state that occurred through the 
expansion of trade and empire which caused long-run growth in 
government income from customs duties and so on.  The first was 
often short-term and born out of crisis; the second resulted from the 
development of broader policy and strategy objectives. Yet, the extent 
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to which ministers were able to factor in overseas resources into their 
calculations of national strength remains unclear. In the British case 
there were certainly plenty of general comments about trade and 
empire adding to the resources of the state, but it is likely that 
Cuenca’s conclusions would have come as something as a surprise to 
ministers, and they would have been unaware of how precisely the 
Indian empire was a source of strength to Britain. Certainly, there is 
little detailed discussion of this in ministerial papers, and there were 
no plans developed for the systematic exploitation of the empire in 
support of war efforts. We need to know whether this is in fact 
correct, and what the case was in other European states. 
The discussion of trading companies by Stern and Paul raises 
the general question of where the boundaries of the eighteenth-century 
state should be drawn. Certainly the EIC came to be described as an 
arm of the state, and, although less well-documented, the cases of the 
South Sea Company and the Royal African Company, as Paul 
indicates, suggest that for the early eighteenth century at least, these 
companies can be conceptualised in similar terms. Yet while Paul 
talks of working partnerships between companies and the state, Stern 
tracks an evolving relationship was increasingly far from being a 
partnership of equals. He talks of ‘co-option’, and consideration needs 
to be given to the extent to which Britain was becoming a ‘co-optive’ 
state, systematically incorporating interest groups on the basis of 
mutually beneficial partnerships, but which nevertheless were 
formalised in terms that were increasingly unequivocal in terms of 
serving the national interest. 
The whole issue of the boundaries of the state is raised in 
another way by the concept of the ‘contractor state’, as it is deployed 
in Knight’s paper. This is because we are invited to consider the 
practical limits that were imposed upon direct state action, and the 
performance of the navy is seen as being ultimately dependent upon 
the actions of a whole host of private agents spread across different 
localities. Yet, Harding’s paper indicates that we should not minimise 
the effectiveness of central control over the gathering and deploy-
ments of resources. Of course the two positions are not mutually 
exclusive, but the papers raise the key question of the reach of the 
state, and where and when exactly private commercial interests began 
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to exert influence on the deployment of resources. Here, we need to 
know much more about the mechanics, physical movement, and 
ownership of resources prior to deployment in the theatres of conflict. 
Above all, perhaps, these papers reveal that much is now known 
about how states gathered financial resources that were used in 
support of war efforts at home and abroad. Finely detailed work 
throws much light on fiscal regimes, government borrowing, and 
financial administration.  By sharp contrast, very little work has been 
done on how effectively the European states actually spent the money 
they had at their disposal. Much more needs to be known about 
spending decisions, the control of expenditure, and how precisely 
finanacial resources were translated into the financial and human 
resources that were deployed in arenas of conflict in support of 
national interest. With this in mind, it is very much to be hoped that 
the research collaborations that underpinned the success of Session 69 
at the IEHA congress at Helsinki can now be extended into a 
comparative study of how the early modern European states spent the 
resources that were mobilised for the express purpose of waging war. 

